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Summary findings
Many developing countries have been reluctant to  The new Round should be a single undertaking,  to
participate in multilateral trade negotiations except for  maximize tradeoffs across issues and for political
those on agriculture and services, topics mandated under  economy reasons: to permit liberalizing forces
previous World Trade  Organization (WTO) decisions.  everywhere to exert pressure on governments to
Michalopoulos argues that developing countries can gain  liberalize world trade.  But there should not be too many
significant benefits from a broader WTO Millennium  issues, as that would strain the capacities of the poorer
Round of negotiations but must develop strategies for  and least developed economies.
participating in it.  In a new WTO Round, developing countries should be
Different groups of countries will have different  prepared to exchange liberalizing trade concessions on a
interests, but developing countries as a group may want  most-favored-nation basis. Liberalization of their own
to include additional issues in the new Round, especially  trade in exchange for improved access to the markets of
industrial tariffs and trade-related aspects of intellectual  their trading partners, most of which are other
property rights.  developing countries, is the only way to maximize
It may also be to their advantage to include discussions  benefits from multilateral trade negotiations.  Efforts to
on trade-related environmental issues and government  obtain special and differential treatment should focus on
procurement,  if they obtain the institutional support they  establishing realistic transition periods and technical
need to meet their commitments under any new  assistance to address constraints on their institutional
agreements.  capacity.
Other topics should be resisted because they are
premature or counterproductive or do not promise net
benefits for most developing countries.
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In the next few months developing countries will need to develop strategies for their participation in
a series of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO. Many developing countries have
been reluctant to participate in  negotiations other than on agriculture and services, topics which have been
mandated under previous WTO decisions.  This paper argues that developing  countries can derive significant
benefits from a broader WTO Millennium Round of negotiations. While the interests of different groups of
countries will  differ, there  is  a  number of  important issues beyond agriculture and  services, which
developing countries as a group  may wish to include in a new Round, especially those of industrial tariffs
and TRIPS. It may also be advantageous  that environment  and government procurement  be included in such
a  Round, provided appropriate assurances regarding the  provision of  institutional  support  to  permit
developing countries to  meet  their commitments can be assured. Other  topics should be resisted for
inclusion because they are either counterproductive,  premature or do not hold promise for net benefits for
large groups of developing countries.
The new Round should be a single undertaking in order to maximize the opportunities for trade-
offs across issues and for political economy reasons, i.e. to permit liberalizing forces in both developed and
developing countries to exert pressure on governments  for a liberalized trade environment world-wide. But
the Round should not contain too many issues, as it would strain the institutional and implementation
capacity of many developing countries, especially the Least Developed.
In a new WTO Round developing countries should be prepared to exchange mutually liberalizing
trade concessions, because that is the only way to maximize the benefits they obtain from multilateral trade
negotiations. Their focus on special and differential treatment should be on  the establishment of realistic
transition periods and technical assistance to address institutional  capacity constraints.
2DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  STRATEGIES  FOR  THE MILLENNIUM  ROUND
IL  Introduction
As developing countries approach the new millennium, they will need to develop strategies for
participation in a series of important trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO: negotiations on
further  liberalization of trade  in agriculture and  services are scheduled to  start in  1999-2000, as is a
review of the TRIPS agreement; and the WTO Ministerial meeting scheduled for November  1999, for
which preparations are already under way, may result in the decision to launch a new Millennium Round
of trade negotiations.
Developing countries strategies for these negotiations should address the  scope of the  future
negotiations, the extent and basis of their participation, the degree and nature of liberalizing commitments
they would be prepared to make and those they would seek to obtain from their trading partners. No
single strategy would suit them all. Developing countries members of the WTO have  a range of different
trading interests. Accordingly, they will each need to develop different strategies and pursue them in the
context of coalitions with other members-whether  developing countries or not.
The purpose of this paper is threefold: (a) to identify and analyse the issues that are likely to be
considered for inclusion in future multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO; (b) to
explore  the interests of different groups of developing countries in each of these issues; and (c) to suggest
strategies whose end-objective would be to  further the  integration of  developing countries  into the
multilateral trading system. The analysis will consider the advantages and disadvantages for developing
countries of an inclusive Millennium Round (MR) as opposed to participating in sectoral negotiations as
well as the scope of negotiations in such a Round and the basis of developing country participation-i.e.
whether they  emphasize negotiations based on  the  mutual exchange of  liberalizing commitments or
whether they focus on seeking special and differential treatment (S & D) from their trading partners.
The paper is organized as follows: first, there is a general review of current developing country
trade policies and attitudes towards trade reform and multilateral trade liberalization with an emphasis on
the differing  priorities of  various developing country groups as these are emerging in the preparations
for the November WTO Ministerial. Second, there is an analysis of the various subjects that are likely to
come up for negotiation, some which are already agreed and some which are quite contentious. The next
3section  contains  a  discussion  of  strategies  for  developing  country  participation  in  the  upcoming
negotiations. The final section contains a summary of conclusions and recommendations'
II. The Trade Policy Environment and the Preparations for the 1999 WTO  Ministerial
During the last decade, developing countries have made great progress in liberalizing their trade
regimes. Various studies have shown that: (a) applied tariffs have been substantially lowered from their
levels in the 1980's and many countries have bound a significant number of tariff lines in the context of
the Uruguay Round Agreements (URA);  (b) the overall use of non-tariff barriers to trade has decreased
significantly in practically all countries; (c) a stait has been to liberalise trade in services as part of the
URA; (d) in general, the overall incidence of government intervention has declined. As a consequence
developing countries have on the whole become far better integrated in the multilateral trading system
than they were a decade ago 2.
At the same time, a number of important issues remain: For example, many developing country
tariff  bindings  are at  levels  much  higher than  applied tariffs  creating uncertainty  to  investors  and
exporters  wishing  to  access  developing  country  markets  as  well  as  an  opportunity  for  resurgent
protectionism; while the overall use of non-tariff barriers to trade has decreased, the use of trade remedies
such as antidumping has increased-indeed  in recent periods anti-dumping cases brought by developing
countries have exceeded those by industrial countries [Miranda et. al., 1998]. There is also rising evidence
that institutional weaknesses in many  developing countries, in particular the Least Developed (LDC) and
low income countries,  are making it difficult  for them to implement WTO commitments in many areas,
but especially  in  Trade-Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS),  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary
Measures  (SPS),  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  (TBT),  and  Customs  Valuation  (WTO  1997-1998;
UNCTAD 1998).
It  can be argued that  a dualism  has emerged  in terms  of the participation  of developing
countries in the WTO:  there is a group of  perhaps 20-25, mostly  middle-higher  income developing
countries, primarily from Latin America and Asia, which have become pretty much fully integrated into
the multilateral trading system: They participate actively in the WTO, they abide by the same rules, use
similar types of trade remedies such as antidumping as more developed members,  and take  advantage of
The study  is similar in  structure and objectives  to  one prepared in advance of the UR (Balassa &
Michalopoulos,  1986).
2  See  Martin  and Winters, 1996; Finger  et.al., 1996;  Drabek  and Laird,  1998; Michalopoulos,  1999b
4the opportunities offered by dispute settlement. On the other hand, there are as many as 50-60 developing
country members of the WTO which are not effectively integrated  in the multilateral trading system and
their participation in the WTO is marginally different from their limited  involvement with the GATT in
the previous decade (Michalopoulos 1999a).
Market access opportunities have also generally improved for most developing countries in the
aftermath of the UR. Tariffs on manufactures in industrial country markets have declined as have non-
tariff  barriers  on most products-especially  in agriculture, as a  consequence of tariffication  (OECD,
1997). Voluntary Export Restraints(VERs) have been eliminated among  WTO members, while anti-
dumping actions declined  after 1995 -- only to surge again more recently.  On the other hand, there are
still tariff  peaks  in several product groups, in both agriculture and  manufactures; the Agreement  on
Textile and Clothing seems to have resulted in limited, if any, actual liberalization of the sector so far in
major markets (WTO, 1997); several recent trade disputes suggest that provisions in the SPS and TBT
agreements carry the potential of being used as non-tariff measures; and a number of countries in Africa
and elsewhere have already lost or are in danger of losing market access as a consequence of dilution of
preferences previously enjoyed in developed country markets-especially  the EU.
While there has been undeniable progress in the trade policies of developing countries and in the
market access environment for their exports, the Asian crisis and the  economic slowdown
in  1998-1999, have fuelled new protectionist tendencies in both developed and  developing countries.
While actual increases in protection have so far been limited, there are  ominous signs: The increasing
rate of anti-dumping actions in the US and EU in  1998, the pressure for more protection against steel
imports in the US and, possibly, the EU,  are all signs of protectionism in developed country markets. In
the developing countries there have been tariff increases in a number of countries ( Mexico, Philippines)
as well as increased import monitoring ( Argentina, Brazil). Finally,  the postponement of the  second
round  of tariff  cuts  under  Information  Technology Agreement  (ITA)  in  which  both  developed and
developing countries participate, is another cause of concern.
This environment has led  govemments in some developing countries, especially in East Asia,
which depend on the openness of intemational market for the restoration of their economic growth, to
endorse further trade liberalization efforts. In others however, governments have questioned the wisdom
of further  liberalization.  In still others, especially the LDCs and many in Africa, which are only still
marginally  integrated  into  the  multilateral  trading  system, policies  and  attitudes  are  clouded  with
5uncertainty: the International Financial Institutions, on whom many of these countries rely for financial
support, continue to urge their governments to  adopt liberal trade  regimes. Yet the  Asian crisis,  has
heightened government concerns about the impact of globalization on fragile economies with pervasive
poverty. Most  of  these  countries  also  feel  that  they  can  not  shoulder the  additional  liberalization
commitments  of  a  new  round  of  multilateral  negotiations  simply  because  they  do  not  have  the
institutional capacity to do so: their institutions are having difficulty in coping with implementing the
previous round of commitments under the URA, let alone accommodate new ones.
In this complex and uncertain international environment, discussions have been  underway in the
WTO for the preparation of the November 1999 Mlinisterial  Meeting which is to reach agreement  on the
scope and content of future multilateral trade negotiations. Preparations for the third session of the WTO
Ministerial Conference are proceeding along four different tracks, agreed in the 1998 WTO Ministerial:
(a) Implementation issues related to the URA; (b) Negotiations and future work agreed upon inMarakesh
( e.g. negotiations on  agriculture and  services); (c) possible future work on the basis  of the program
initiated at the WTO  Singapore Ministerial Meeling in 1996 and the follow up to the 1997 WTO High
Level Meeting on LDCs; and (d) new Issues that could be the subject of multilateral trade negotiations.
Developing countries have been at the forefront of arguing that the WTO should not undertake
negotiations on  any  new topics  unless the URA have  been  "fully implemented". Egypt,  India  and
Pakistan  have been providing the leadership on this position for a significant group of countries, which
includes many among the poorest and LDCs. These are countries which, on the whole, have less liberal
trade regimes and  weaker institutional infrastructure in support of international trade. These are also
countries which have tended to emphasize the special and differential aspects of their participation in the
WTO (see below).
In a way the arguments put forth by these countries are eerily reminiscent of arguments by some
of the same countries in the years before the UR was launched. At that time, India and Egypt (with Brazil)
led the developing country opposition to the launching of what eventually became the Uruguay Round on
the  grounds that the  "Framework Agreement" of the Tokyo Round-which  essentially contained  the
special and differential provisions in favor of developing countries under the  GATT-as  well  as the
results of 1982 GATT Ministerial and the work program of the GATT,  had not been fully implemented
(Michalopoulos, 1985, pp.  18-19,  57).
6But it is fair to say that in the context of the preparations for the 1999 Ministerial,  a large number
of developing countries, reflecting the views of different groups,  have focused on different aspects of
inadequacies in the implementation of the URA: In general, some groups of countries, the ASEAN, the
textile  exporters,  the  CAIRNS group,  have  tended to  emphasize the  flaws  in  the  way the  WTO
agreements have been implemented which have been damaging to their trading interests. Other countries,
especially, but not exclusively, lower income ones in Africa and elsewhere, have been focusing on special
and differential aspects of the agreements and the lack of implementation of the largely "best efforts" type
of S&D commitments developed countries have made in practically all WTO agreements, the insufficient
technical assistance provided and the inadequacy of the transition periods.3
The Appendix contains a summary of the main concerns about implementation and the groups of
developing countries broadly associated with them. The summary is not exhaustive and does not purport
to  cover all  the points  raised by  all  developing countries.  There are two  issues of implementation,
however, that  deserve  particular  attention as they  affect  large  groups of  developing  countries: the
adequacy of technical assistance provided  and the transition periods envisaged under the URA in the
light of continued weaknesses in the institutional capacities of developing countries.
The WTO  agreements contain numerous references to  the  desirability of  developed country
members and international institutions to provide technical assistance to developing countries in areas in
which  they are hampered by  institutional capacity weaknesses such as TRIPS, TBT,  SPS etc  .5  The
integrated program  of technical assistance to the LDCs launched after the WTO High Level Meeting on
Trade-related Technical Assistance to LDCs has made only limited progress in addressing these problems
(WTO, 1999c); and  technical assistance needs are faced by many low income developing countries, not
only LDCs.  Sometimes, the problem may not be the availability of funding, but rather the lack of an
integrated approach among donors and recipients.
The WTO agreements also provide for extensions in the time frame over which certain obligations
under the agreements are to be implemented by developing and least developed countries. Time extensions
3  There  are apparently  at least  seventy  five  such  references in  the WTO  agreements  ( WTO,  1999a).
4  Other issues raised by developing  countries not covered in detail,  involved  implementation  of customs
valuation  procedures,  safeguards,  the impact  of the agreements  on Least  Developed  countries,  notification,  and
accession.  Several developed  countries  also  raised questions  of implementation  in  many of the same  areas.
5  See  inter alia SPS Article  9.1; TBT Article  11, 12.7;  Implementation  of  GATF  Article  VII--  Article  20.3; Pre Shipment
Inspection,  Article  1.2;  TRIPS  Article  67;  DSB  Article  27.2;  TPRM  Section  D.
7have been provided for a variety of obligations  assumed e.g. under the  TRIPS Agreement, in subsidies and
countervailing  and in the Agreement on Agriculture. The transition periods negotiated at the conclusion of
the UR,  were rather arbitrarily set and bear little relation to the time it takes to build the appropriate
institutions to implement the commitments made.  In some cases,  the time limits for the extensions are
rapidly approaching and there is little evidence that countries have made sufficient progress in institution
building to permit  them to implement their obligations fully. In other cases, developing countries had to
submit notifications to the WTO to avail themselves of particular S&D provisions. Some did and many did
not. And there is little reason to believe that those that failed to notify were aware of the options they had
and chose not to avail themselves  of the latitude provided.
Complaints about "implementation" also involve staking out a bargaining position by developing
countries which can be used as a bargaining chip later on to fend off developed country demands for
liberalization commitments in some new areas which many do not wish to pursue. In the  1980's these
involved trade in services which many developing countries vehemently opposed for inclusion in the UR.
In the 1990's they may involve such topics as investment,. labour standards, or the environment.
III. The Built-in Agenda for Negotiations
There are two agreed topics for negotiations: Agriculture and Services. In addition there are on-
going negotiations on non-preferential rules of origin which, if not concluded by the end of the year may
have to be folded in a new Round (Croome, 1998).
A. Agriculture
Developing countries' interests  in agricultural trade vary considerably. First, there is the group of
major exporters of agricultural commodities ( Argentina, Thailand) which  are members of the Cairns
Group (for a listing see the Appendix). These countries' position is already clear. They will be looking to:
(a) early, total elimination and prohibition of expolt subsidies which tend to undermine the competitive
position of efficient developing country producers; and in the  same connection,  seek to regulate the
provision of export credits; (b) deep cuts in tariffs, removal of non-tariff barriers, increase in trade volume
under tariff- quotas so as to enhance market access prospects; (c ) elimination of trade distorting domestic
support measures (WTO, 1998a).
8Second, there  is a  large  group, consisting  of the net  food  importing developing  countries
(NFIDC) and others,  with a significant agricultural sector which produce but also  import food, and
export various agricultural products.6  Past policies in many of these countries tended to penalize rather
than support the agriculture sector. Two kinds of concerns have been raised by several of these countries.
First, while supporting reductions in export subsidies and trade distorting domestic supports in developed
countries,  the limits to aggregate support and export subsidies contained in the agreement ( and their
possible further tightening in the new negotiations), would limit their capacity to increase support to the
agriculture sector should they in the future decide to do so'  Second, that although reduction in export
subsidies by  developed countries will be beneficial to their own domestic agricultural production, the
resulting increase in prices of foodstuffs would increase foreign exchange outlays for  poor,  net food
importing countries which can ill afford them.
While  the  UR  agreement  on  agriculture  focused  on  distortions  primarily  introduced  to
agricultural  trade  by  developed  country practices,  it  contains provisions  which  pernit  developing
countries to increase support to agriculture (  and to poor consumers) through means not available to
developed countries: 8 For example, direct and indirect investment and  input subsidies to poor farmers are
excluded  from  the  calculation  of  aggregate  measures  of  support  (AMS);  reduction  in  support
commitments  by  developing  countries can take  ten years to  be  implemented while  least developed
countries (LDCs) are totally  exempt; food subsidies to urban  and  rural poor  are excluded  from the
calculation of  support, etc.  Moreover, there is considerable difference between the applied and bound
tariff rates in agriculture for these countries. Simple (unweighted), applied tariffs in agriculture averaged
25% compared to 66% for  bound rates for 31 developing countries (excluding Cairns group members),
which suggests that there is considerable scope for increases in their protection of agriculture,  should
they wish to do so (Michalopoulos 1999 b) 9.
It can be argued however, that the exception of the investment and input subsidies provided to
poor rural households from the calculation of the AMS is subject to the "peace clause"-Article  13 of the
6  There  is also  a third group  with small  non  diversified  agricultural  sectors,  either  because  of climatic  conditions
or land constraints  ( e.g. small island economies),  which are not likely  to be significant  participants  in these
discussions
7  Some also point to the "unfairness"  of the agriculture  agreement  as it still permits  greater  support levels for
developed  countries  -which had in the past given a great deal of assistance  to their agricultural  sector-as
opposed  to the developing  countries  which  penalized  agriculture  in the base  period  (Das,  1998).
8  It should  be recalled  however,  as part of the URA and previous  negotiations,  there were significant  reductions
in tariffs  on horticultural  and floricultural  products  of interest  to developing  countries.
9Agreement on Agriculture  and thereby limited to the 1992 levels of support (  Kwa and Bello  1998).
This may indeed result in unreasonable restraints for low income developing countries which may wish
over time to increase their support for the  rural poor. To eliminate this ambiguity, such subsidies could be
included in the  "Green Box" of measures which are permitted under all  circumstancesl 0 But,  on the
whole, and with the possible exception noted above, it is difficult to visualise circumstances where the
Agreement  seriously constrains  developing countries efforts to pursue policies that would  efficiently
promote their agricultural sector.
There is little evidence that the export subsidy reductions of the UR agreement have led to an
increase in import expenditures of poor NFIDCs. Even so, it is legitimate to ask what might happen in the
future and what is the proper international response to such a potential problem.
The problem  relates to the possible adverse short term effects of eliminating trade  distorting
measures on poor NFIDC, which are likely to be outweighed by the longer term world wide efficiency
gains.  Actually the short term effects are also likely to spread out over time-as  the distortions are
bound  to be phased out rather than eliminated at once. And it would be very difficult to isolate  the
impact  of the  resulting  price  increases from  other factors,  including the  developing  countries  own
policies. It is for this reason that IMF did not provide automatic financing from its Compensatory Finance
Facility for Cereals  but drawings from the CFF were included in the overall IMF program  to individual
countries.
The recently negotiated Food Aid Convention (International Grains Council,  1999) stipulates
that,  when allocating food aid,  priority should be given to  LDCs and  low income countries. Other
NFIDCs  can also be  provided with food aid  "when experiencing food emergencies or international
recognized financial crises leading to food shortage emergencies or when food aid operations are targeted
on vulnerable groups"  But there is nothing-- and there should be nothing-automatic  about the assistance
provided. Indeed, if a need can be shown to exist, the international response should not be limited to food
aid but extend to all kinds of general purpose financing on appropriate terms. The latter would be better
than food aid, which is frequently  tied to procurement from a particular donor and determined by food
stock availability  in the donor rather than the needs of the recipient.
9  Although  there  may be some  problems  for LDCs  regarding  the limits  on AMS  after the expiry  of the transition
periods (UNCTAD,  1998).
10  An alternative  would  be to exempt  from  challenges  under  the subsidies  agreement
10In sum, the large number of developing countries for which the agriculture sector  is an important
source of income and employment, especially for the poor, would benefit from a further liberalization of
the sector-subject  to some conditions discussed below, and should join the Cairns group members in
their  efforts to (a) seek a  very substantial reduction in export subsidies; these subsidies, which  are
primarily extended by developed countries, tend to undermine developing countries' efforts to stimulate
increases  in  their  own  agricultural  output;  (b)  seek  to  improve  market  access  for  their  potential
agricultural exports by negotiating for significant reductions in tariffs and opening up of tariff quotas.
At the same time they need to safeguard those aspects of the Agreement  ( as well as add new
ones, if appropriate) which permit them to extend assistance of various types to poor farmers as well as
maintain programs of assistance and food security to the poor. But these measures should not introduce
distortions between selling to domestic market and abroad; or as between sectors. Finally, the matter of
increasing  costs  to  net  food  importing countries is  better  addressed in  the  context of  the  overall
availability of concessionary finance to these countries, rather in the context of food aid.
It is unclear at this juncture what form the negotiations of improving market access in agriculture
will take, e.g. whether formula cuts for tariffs would be agreed upon or not. The variance of tariffs  in
agriculture tends to be higher than for manufactures in both developed and developing countries. In such
circumstances, formulas which result in proportionally greater reductions in peak tariffs are more likely to
result in trade  increases. For the developing countries, given the amount of  escalation present in many
developed countries tariffs, it may well be advantageous to push for formulas that would lead to greater
reduction in processed food products.
The extent of reciprocity  in tariff  cuts and  other aspects of liberalization, is discussed more
systematically in section V below.  Suffice it to say at this point, that in seeking to open up other markets,
developing  countries  need to  consider not  only how  much they  have  to  "pay",  in the  traditional
WTO/GATT sense, but also how  further opening of their own markets will result in improvements in
their long term efficiency and incomes.
11B. Services
In the aftermath of the great confrontations between developed and developing countries over the
inclusion of services in the UR, the implementation of the agreement has resulted in comparatively little
controversy. This is in part because the service agreement involves on the whole voluntary commitments
of liberalization through a  combination of positive and negative lists which have excluded modes  of
supply  or sectors in which countries have wished to avoid foreign competition. In part it also reflects that
a  significant number of developing countries have recognized the  adverse effects that  protection of
inefficient service sectors can have on the rest of the economy, e.g. through the high cost of service inputs
on the competitiveness of the export sector. And  it is precisely for this reason that many participated
actively in the successful conclusion of two additional sectoral negotiations since the end of UR, those on
financial services and on telecommunications.
Nonetheless, it is clear that developing countries have made far fewer commitments for service
liberalization than developed countries and on the whole will find themselves under pressure to make
more. Also, in some cases, countries have liberalized certain aspects of their service provisions but have
not "bound" these commitments in the WTO; which raises an issue analogous to the question of how to
give "credit" to such liberalization in the context of negotiations which had also been raised in the UR
with respect to goods. Finally, one of the problems inhibiting some countries from liberalizing further is
the absence of a suitable safeguard clause in the GATS. While Article X of  GATS requires negotiations
whose result should enter  into effect no  later than three  years after the entry into force of the  WTO
agreement, i.e. by 1998, this has not happened.
What is the appropriate strategy for developing countries in this  setting? There are no obvious
developing country groupings as is the case with agriculture. Rather, there  is a  large range from the
LDCs, with scarcely any modern domestic service providers,  to middle  income countries  with some
very advanced service sectors concerned with market access in developed countries, and many countries
in-between.  There are also some countries which have  comparative advantage in  certain  kinds  of
services, e.g.  construction  and are concerned about market access issues in developed countries for these
sectors. There  is however, one mode of supply and two sectors that hold special interest for developing
countries: Movement of natural persons and construction and  maritime services.
12Movement of Natural Persons. While some progress has been made  regarding the movement of
qualified professionals to work abroad, developed country restrictions inhibit increased service earnings
for developing countries through this mode of supply. The commitments on trade in services have tended
to  emphasize  measures  regulating  commercial  presence-which  is  important  for  foreign  direct
investment, rather than "mode four" involving movement of natural persons.
The commitments made regarding the movement of natural persons have  primarily  involved
intra-corporate  transferees  and  business visitors  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  independent  professionals,
including those providing services within a service contract. One of the limitations imposed by a large
number  of  countries  is  an  economic  needs  test  (ENT).  This  typically  involves judgements  by
government agencies based  on non-transparent criteria,  as to  market conditions,  availability of local
service providers etc, regarding which foreign service providers to permit and which not. Indeed of the 54
countries which have made commitments subject to a needs test, only three have stated criteria for the
ENT. Frequently, the result is to nullify access commitments involving mode four supply of services.
Developing countries may wish to press both for liberalization of mode four supplies in more professional
categories  and  through limiting  the  use  of  ENT in  specific  sectors and  making  the  ENT  criteria
transparent  and  consistent.  Progress  is desirable  in this  area, although  it should be recognized that
developing countries also have restrictions in this  mode of supply that  should be  lifted as part of the
negotiations.
Construction Services. In addition to overall liberalization in mode four commitments,  specific
sector based liberalization involving the movement of natural persons may be important in the area of
construction services.  Several developing countries, especially in Asia, have the capacity of exporting
such services, or other services based on their comparative advantage in labour intensive activities which
are constrained by developed country restrictions on "movement of natural persons".
Maritime  Services.  Efforts  to  reach  agreement  in  this  sector  failed  in  1995-1996 and  the
negotiations were suspended with a view to resuming them  in the  wider  context of the negotiations
starting  in  2000.  This  should  be  a  major area of  interest  for  developing  countries  in  the  service
negotiations:  "The oceans  are  populated by  cartels.. .known  as  shipping  conferences" (Francois  and
Wooton  1999, p.4). These cartels set prices and pursue  other collusive activities in 85% or more of
maritime services they control and they are often exempted from antitrust law in developed countries.
13Their impact in raising transport costs to poorer developing countries, especially to low volume,
high distance destinations-in  Africa and poorer  island economies can be even more important  than
further tariff  liberalization: shipping margins on  rmerchandise  trade  in  Sub-Saharan Africa exceed six
percent compared with OECD tariffs ( after preferences are taken into account) of less than two percent
(Francois and Wooton, 1999). Liberalization in this  sector, which would lead to  increased competition
and reduced margins may be of great importance to many of the small economies members of the WTO.
Also,  liberalization could  lead to  increases in the provision of  maritime  shipping  services by  some
developing countries themselves.
In  addition to  these  specific areas  of  interest, developing  countries  need  to  press  for  the
establishment of a  suitable transparent  and  non-discriminatory safeguard mechanism.  While  further
liberalization of their service sector would in many cases be in their own interest, the political economy of
trade reform requires that a suitable safeguard mechanism is put in place for trade in services just as it is
for  trade in goods.
In sum,  the service negotiations offer opportunities for developing countries to open up further
their own service sectors, which many may wish to do in any case,  in order to reap the benefits  of
increased efficiency. In exchange they should seek liberalization in certain sectors and modes of supply of
interest to them; but condition any offer for further liberalization on agreement that a suitable safeguard
mechanism on services is agreed upon.
C. Rules of Origin
Unlike the other two subjects discussed above, negotiations on establishing harmonized rules of
origin are actually already under way-and  have been for some time. There will be an effort to reach
agreement before a new set of negotiations start. If this does not succeed, the topic may end up becoming
part of future negotiations. The key interest of the developing countries, is to avoid setting up rules which
can be  used as substitutes for, or reinforcements of,  quantitative restrictions being phased out under the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. (Croome, 1998).
14IV.  Potential Subjects for New Negotiations
Beyond these two major agreed areas for negotiations, and the ongoing ones on rules of origin,
there is a variety of other subjects which have been suggested for inclusion in a possible new round of
multilateral negotiations. For some, for example, environment, competition and  investment,  preparatory
work  is under way based on  previous WTO Ministerial decisions, or,  as is the  case of government
procurement, under GATS. For others, e.g. trade facilitation and electronic commerce,  work has been
started only more recently;  but there has been no agreement that they should be included in a new round.
Some subjects involve general reviews mandated under the provisions of the existing WTO agreements
which are expected  to occur starting in 2000 and  which could be folded in a new round, e.g. TRIPS,
TRIPS.  Finally, there  are subjects, such as industrial tariff  and labour standards, that  have not been
generally  agreed for any kind of consideration, but which various WTO members have suggested for
inclusion.
This is a vast  array of subjects from which to choose. In some cases, e.g. TRIPs, developing
countries need to develop a position for the review that starts in 2000, and the issue is whether to include
this in a wider array of negotiations or not. But in practically all others developing countries have a choice
of whether to support multilateral negotiations on the subject or not, and whether to do so in separate
negotiations or combine the negotiations in a single undertaking.
The criteria countries use in reaching a decision should include: (a) the net benefits they would
expect to obtain for  their economies both through their own liberalization and through improved access
in the markets  of others; (b) the net benefits that would result from setting new rules and/or changing
existing ones; (c ) the institutional capacity needed to implement whatever new agreements are reached.
The last criterion is very important because of the problems many developing countries have encountered
in implementing existing UR agreements.
Based on these criteria different developing countries may well reach different conclusions on
which of these topics to include in new negotiations, if any. An attempt is made in the discussion that
follows to  reach some broad conclusions about the general desirability of negotiations in each of the
above areas from the standpoint of developing countries as a whole, recognizing that such generalisations
need to be carefully scrutinized in the case of individual countries or groups of countries.
15A. A Potential Developing Country Agenda
Industrial Tariffs'  1. Both developed and developing countries have called for new negotiations in
the context of the preparatory process for the next WTO ministerial meeting (see above). The average
trade  weighted MFN applied tariffs facing  developing countries exports of manufactures  in  OECD
markets, though small in absolute terms (3.4%), tend to be almost four times as high as those faced by
other OECD countries. Industrial products make up more than 70% of exports of developing countries
and are of importance to practically everywhere except Sub-Sahara  Africa (Hertel  and Martin,  1999).
Such negotiations also offer  an opportunity to address the continuing problem of tariff peaks that are still
present in developed country markets for products of interest to developing country exporters.
In order to  obtain such reductions however, it  is clear that developing countries would need
provide increased opportunities for access to their own markets for such products. Their applied industrial
tariffs  are typically higher than in industrial countries and with a greater degree of dispersion--  i.e. there
are tariff peaks in developing countries also. Moreover, increasingly,  developing countries exports of
manufactures are directed to other developing countries rather than  developed country markets.  But,
except for  Latin America, a  large number of developing countries have not bound significant portions of
their industrial tariffs. Even those that have, often use "ceiling bindings" , with bound rates much  higher
than applied rates.
To achieve reductions in tariff  peaks a formula approach could be used that results in  greater
proportional reductions of high bound tariff rates  in both developed and developing  countries (Laird,
1999).  Other approaches may  also be feasible,  but in such cases, developing  countries may  be at  a
disadvantage because few of their markets are individually large enough to be of "interest" to developed
countries participating in the negotiations.
While such a negotiation is in principle of considerable interest the  difficulties in reducing tariff
peaks should also be recognized. Tariff peaks in developed countries-defined  here as products on which
tariffs  are at least 12% or roughly three times their average MEFN  tariff on manufactures-are  present in
the following products  and product groups: (a) major agricultural staple food products such as meat,
sugar, milk and cereals; (b) cotton and tobacco; (c) fruits and vegetables; (d) processed food products-
The term "industrial"  is a slight  misnomer:  It basically  includes  all tariff lines other than those classified  as
"agriculture".  The latter  was defined  in the UR to include  HS Categories  1-24  and a few additional  lines from a
number of other HS categories ( WVTO,  1995).
16canned meat, fruit juices  etc.;  (e) textiles and clothing; (f) footwear and leather products; (g)  selected
automotive and transport equipment products (UNCTAD/WTO, 1997). Product groups (a-d) above  are
agricultural commodities, which would be the subject of the agriculture negotiations. It will be difficult to
get  developed countries, especially the US, 12  to negotiate their  tariff rates on textiles and clothing,
which under the Agreeemnt on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) would be the only mechanism of protection
of this  sector (  for WTO members)  after 2005. But  clearly an effort should be made. After all  the
developed coutnries will be asking developing countries to make commitments in a number of "sensitive
sectors" as well. Finally,  leather and footwear and transport equipment are important in a number of
developing  countries, but obviously to  a  narrower group than  those affected also  by  tariff  peaks  in
agriculture and textiles.
Despite  the  difficulties,  a  potentially mutually beneficial negotiation  could  occur  in which
developing countries, reduce ceiling bindings-and  perhaps some applied rates as well, in exchange for
further  reductions  in  industrial tariffs  of  developed countries-which  however,  included  significant
reductions in "peak " tariff rates. Such a negotiation could yield benefits to the developing countries in a
variety of ways. They would benefit both from their own liberalization-which  typically accounts for the
bulk of the estimated welfare gains-as  well as improve stability in their own trade regimes through
binding more  products and doing so closer to  applied rates. And  they would benefit from  increased
market access in other developing and developed country markets.
TRIPS. Perhaps no other agreement of the UR has generated more concerns in the developing
world than TRIPS. A review of TRIPS is mandated for 2000, and of some aspects of it even earlier. The
review offers an opportunity for the developing countries to address a number of issues of concern to
them. While formally speaking the review does  not involve a  "negotiation", the developing countries
have an interest in making it part of a new round of negotiations. This is an area where some changes in
the existing rules would tend to be beneficial to development, but may be resisted by entrenched interests
in  developed countries. The only way for developing countries to introduce the rules changes they want,
may be by making this topic part  of a larger package.
There are several sets of problems that the agreement poses. At a general level there is  a concern
that  the  efficiency  losses-resulting,  for  example  from  significantly  increased  prices  from
12  EU Commissioner  Brittan  announced  in March,  1999  that  the EU would  not exclude  textiles  and clothing  from
tariff  negotiations.
17pharmaceuticals  would exceed  any dynamic  gains iresulting  from increased  research  and development  or
larger flows of foreign direct investment.  (Correa, 1998,  Deardorf,  1992); or that the length of time
provided  for patent protection  is excessive.  There is also a general concern  that the agreement  does not
provide  for a reasonable  balance  between  the rights of producers  and users of knowledge  and technology;
and that it is based on an outdated concept of "knowledge"  which does not take into account the
externalities  of knowledge  dissemination.  But there is little agreement  on how these broad issues can be
addressed.
The patent system itself poses a variety of problems  for a number of the poorer developing
countries  with an agricultural  based economy:  First, the patent system  is unlikely  to work as an incentive
to  local innovations, except in  countries with a  significant private scientific and  technological
infrastructure. At the same time the Agreement,  by not recognizing  community  proprietary rights to
traditional  knowledge,  has led  commercial  firms in developed  countries  seeking  to obtain proprietary
rights to traditional  medicines  or product  varieties  ("basmati"  rice and the bark of the neem tree are the
most known  examples). The Agreement  may also result  in constraints  on farmers  use of their own seeds
saved from harvest for replanting; and it has tended to  encourage patents in processes involving
biotechnology  aimed at providing  substitutes  for existing  developing  country  exports.  Last, but not least,
developing countries have  experienced difficulties in  implementing the  procedural and  legal
commitments  required  by the agreement.  (UNCTAD,  1998,  WTO, 1997-1998).
Changing a number  of these provisions  to make the agreement  more "development"  friendly,
will not be easy because of the strength  of the commercial  interests in developed countries  which it
protects; but it is certainly worth the effort for developing countries to make change in the most
detrimental  aspects  of the agreement  a fundamental  condition  of trade negotiations.
B. Good  Ideas,  but Can they Be Implemented?
This group of topics contains three issues, government  procurement,  electronic  commerce  and
trade facilitation  in which  new agreements  may result  in welfare  improvements  for developing  countries
but which have institutional  requirements  that may be a  serious burden for many WTO members  to
shoulder.
18Government Procurement.  Few  developing countries have joined  the  plurilateral  agreement
already in place. Some ( Chile, Hong Kong) have noted that while they agree with the objectives of the
agreement, they find its implementation provisions to be quite cumbersome partly because the agreement
is based  on the principle of bilateral reciprocity. On the other hand, participation in the agreement has
become almost mandatory for newly acceding members with the US insisting on all acceding countries
making a commitment in this regard (Michalopoulos, 1998).
There  is  little  doubt that  developing  countries  can  benefit  significantly  from  liberalizing
govenrment procurement  procedures -not  so  much because  of their  capacity  to  gain  international
contracts,  but  in  terms  of  improved resource utilization  through  more  transparent  and  competitive
government  procurement  practices.  As  most  government  purchases  relate  to  services  rather  than
merchandise trade,  the issues have to do essentially with liberalization and national treatment of foreign
service providers. Indeed, a recent paper ( Evennett and Hoekman, 1999) suggests that  it is important to
eliminate preferences in government procurement  before improved competitive practices are put in place.
This  is  because,  if the  opposite sequence is  followed,  under certain  circumstances, preferences  on
govemment procurement could lead to increased resource misallocation.
The issues have to  do with  implementation: Is  this an important enough area for  developing
country WTO members to adopt new multilateral rules? What should these rules be-i.e.  is it desirable
tro  keep  the  government procurement  agreement as  it  is,  or should  it  become a  truly  multilateral
arrangement?  Can developing countries  be assured that the technical assistance that they may need to
implement the new provisions and probably the new legislation required would be forthcoming?
Trade Facilitation. This topic  has generated considerable interest in the private sector in recent
periods and is being considered as one of the areas in which new "rules making" efforts may be desirable.
As formal trade barriers have gone down, procedural requirements of various kinds impede the flow of
goods and services. Innumerable and non-standardized documentation requirements exist for exports and
imports. On average about 60 documents are used in an international trade transaction-and  they often
differ from country to country. These are compounded by antiquated official clearance procedures. Lack
of transparency  and predictability is a major source of uncertainty in terms of the costs  and time for
delivery of commercial transactions. The problems are typically much greater in developing countries
where automated procedures in customs administration do not exist.
19The WTO work so far has identified the following areas in which proposals have been made for
improvements  and  revisions  aimed  at  simplifying  and  standardizing  procedures:  (a)  government
mandated information requirements, (b) procedures for customs clearance; (c) transparency and review;
(d) transport and transit. There are at least eight international conventions and agreements guiding these
areas of which the  most  important is the  1973  International Convention for  the  Simplification  and
Customization of Customs Procedures, (the "Kyoto Convention of 1973), in which no more than half of
WTO members participate.
There is little doubt that developing couni;ries  trade would benefit significantly from such trade
facilitation  measures.  There  is  also  little  doubt  that  few  have  the  technical  capacity  to  adhere
meaningfully to multilateral rules regarding such procedures without significantly strengthening of their
institutions. While technical assistance would obviously be needed, such assistance may not be sufficient
to modernize their institutions in a reasonable period of time. As a consequence, meaningfull progress in
this area may best be  made through first  establishing an  agreement which countries would have an
option of joining at a suitable time in the future  rather than a multilateral agreement which would be part
of  a  single  undertaking  with  rules  which  developing  countries  may  have  serious  difficulties  in
implementing.
Electronic Commerce. Electronic commerce accounts for a small but rapidly growing proportion
of world trade in goods and services. This growth htas  occurred in a legal vacuum with few accepted rules
and  disciplines.  Moreover, the  cross-border nature  of the  transactions has  made  the  issue  of  legal
jursidicton  unclear. There is  little doubt that over  time, a  framework of global  rules for  tranactions
through  the Internet will have to be established. The key issue is whether there is enough understanding
of the issues and enough intemational consensus to attempt to reach an agreement as part of  a new round
of WTO negotiations.
The topic was first raised WTO in the context of the Geneva Ministerial meeting of 1998. At that
time, a standstill was agreed involving a commitment that WTO members, "continue their current practice
of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions" and to produce a report that  may contain
recommendations for action (WTO,  1998b). The original US proposal intended to reach a mutlilateral
agreement  that  would  permanently  exempt  electronic transmissions  from  customs  duties.  Many
developing countries were put off by the proposal at the time as it was felt that it had not been sufficiently
explored and discussed. Some observers thought that the proposal was being rushed as a "price"  to get
20US President Clinton to participate in the Ministerial. In subsequent discussions, developing countries
raised a variety of concerns:. Some thought that such a commitment will result in countries foregoing
future opportunities to collect customs revenue; others were concerned as to whether the electronic mode
of service supply  should be given preferential status relative to other modes which were being regulated.
Most were unwilling to commit because they felt that they did not have enough understanding of the
issues, and because of uncertainties about the policies implications of future technological change.
Developing country concerns about foregone tariff revenues are clearly an exaggeration-after
all,  most  countries provide  large  scale  exemptions to their existing  tariff  schedules.  Further  WTO
discussions,  while reaching  consensus on  a  few points, also  identified a  large  number of  issues: A
consensus is emerging that first, the electronic delivery of services falls within the scope of the GATS and
all GATS provisions are applicable to it; and  second that the "technological neutrality" of GATS means
that electronic supply of services is permitted unless specifically excluded. There are many uncertainties,
however:  (a) how to  classify  internet access and  services, including new  ones; (b)  whether certain
products electronically transmitted should be classified as goods; (c) what are the proper links to the
Telecommunications Agreement; (d) how to ensure  privacy of transactions and how to value encrypted
data; (e) what are the links to TRIPS  e.g. copyright protection for electronic and database material. And
finally, there are many standards related issues involving interconnection and interoperabiltity of systems
which need to be addressed to ensure that standards setting by governments does not impede electronic
commerce (WTO, 1999 b).
The major concern that most developing countries should have in the area of electronic commerce
is simply that they do not have the technical capcity to negotiate meaningfully a mutlilateral agreement at
this  time. To do so in most cases may result in assuming commitments which they have neither the
capacity to understand or implement. Thus, it may well be that at present, developing countries agree
simply  to continue the standstill on protection, and defer multilateral negotiations on this issue to a later
time. Of course, if a significant number of WTO members feel the need for an agreement, such an
agreement could be put in place but should not be part of a single undertaking requiring developing
country participation.
21C. Some Difficult Issues
Environment. Issues involving  the various links between trade and the environment have been
discussed extensively in the WTO for the last five years.' 3 The issues are thorny and complex, driven by
two concerns: on the part of the developed countries, a desire to be responsive to strong pressures exerted
by  domestic environmental groups to preserve global biodiversity and  prevent environmental  damage
through all possible measures-including  trade  reslrictions;  and on the part of developing  countries,
concerns that developed countries violate WTO rules when they act to restrict access to their market on
environmental  grounds,  sometimes  unilaterally  determined,  and  especially  when  the  alleged
environmental damage occurs beyond the developed :ountries' own borders and extends to  processes and
production methods (PPMs) of the traded merchandise
There are several sets of interrelated issues that have formed the basis of the debate so far, and the
positions on these issues vary both among developed and developing countries. Only an outline of the
issues is attempted here, rather than a discussion of the positions taken by different countries.
(a) The relationship between trade  provisions of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA)
and the WTO. This includes questions such as,  which MEAs to include; what to do in case the measures
are incompatible with the WTO; what to do regarding countries which not members of a particular MEA;
and which dispute settlement meachnisms to use.
(b) Whether and how to take into account PPMs as they relate to the environment in the framing
of trade rules; and in this connection what weight to put on multilateral agrreements ( for example on
ozone depleting substances) or unilateral judgements, such as those used by the US in the tuna- dolphin
case or the precautionary principle used by the EC.  In the same context, what to do about eco-labelling
schemes, which could adversely affect imports  from specific developing countries, and how to  bring
them in conformity with broader WTO rules on standards.
( c) The general relationship between trade, environment and development. This has many facets,
including  the formal recognition that poverty is a major cause of environmental degradation;  provision
of assistance to developing countries to promote sustainable development; issues related to the impact of
13  There is an enormous  literature  on the subject.  A useful summary  of the main issues in the debate from a
developing  country  perspective  is presented  in Shahin,  1997,  See  also  OECD,  1999.
22new environmentally motivated standards imposed by  developed countries on the  competitiveness of
developing countries exports; and  the broad relationship of different trade liberalization measures and
the environment (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1996).
Developing countries face the following basic dilemma: should  they negotiate an agreement
covering the various complex trade and environment issues, which would involve legitimizing through
explicit detailed understandings different market access  restraints on environmental grounds, but would
limit the more blatant unilateral developed country  abuses; or should they leave the system as it is, when
developed countries can use the broad language of GATT Article XXb to restrain trade on environmental
grounds ( recently interpreted very broadly by the Appepalte Body in the shrimp- turtle case),  and rely on
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) to curb developed country abuses? Various developing
countries would respond to this dilemma differently. But on balance, it may well be that, given the strong
pressure that both the EU and the US would bring to bear on including this  issue and the difficulties
developing countries have faced in using  the DSM, they may wish to agree to including environment in
the agenda-as  part of an overall understanding on a set of negotiations that meet their other objectives,
e.g. regarding restricting developed countries' subsidies in energy, fisheries or agriculture which  may
have adverse effects on the environment; and/or the provision of assistance to developing coutnries to
help them address poverty issues that contribute to environmental degradation.
Competition  The issue was originally placed on the WTO agenda by the US as a means of
promoting greater market access, especially in the Japanese market -where  it felt, that poorly enforced
competition laws disadvantaged US exporters. Following the WTO Ministerial in Singapore a working
group was established to analyse the issues involved. Competition policy is currently being advocated as
an issue for negotiations by EC, but the US has cooled off in its advocacy for a WTO  agreement.
There  is  no  agreement  on  how  to  proceed  in the  WTO.  The alternative  approaches  being
considered include: (a)  the establishment of minimum anti-trust standards that would prohibit certain
practices while  applying  notification requirements on  others, but which  would  be  administered by
national authorities (EU); (b) linking competiton policy to limitations in the use of other WTO practices.,
e.g. anti-dumping (Japan, other Asian countries);  (c) extending the coverage of WTO rules under Article
XXIII of the GATT which allows WTO members to challenge practices which, while not illegal under
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WTO rules, result in nullification of benefits negotiated in trade agreements.4
4  For a useful  review  see WTO,  1997a,  Vol. 1, Chapter  4.
23For  small  developing  economies,  an  open trade  regime  and  liberal policies  toward  foreign
investment may be sufficient to cope with most problems arising from domestically generated restrictive
business practices. For those that  have  enacted competition laws,  implementation capacity  is  often
limited. The highest priority for  many  is to establish and implement proper national competition policies
which need to focus on facilitating new entry, elimin-ating  adminstrative obstacles to the establishment of
new firms (including foreign ones) reducing transport costs which create local monopolies etc, - rather
than establishing and implementing an anti-trust machinery. Moreover, for small developing countries the
key issues regarding restrictive business practices may primarily involve  of transnational corporations
(Hoekman and Holmes,  1999; Low and Subramanian, 1996). These corporations have the potential to
dominate small  economies or reduce the benefits that  accrue to host  countries e.g. through transfer
pricing and related actions that stem  from the large proportion of international trade which involves intra-
firm transactions. Unless such activities are brought under the competition rules proposed, which has not
been the case so far,  there is little reason to focus onl  multilateral rule making for developing countries in
this area.
Neither  the US nor the EU is interested in  introducing competition mechanisms to deal  with
issues covered by anti-dumping. And the recent upsurge of anti-dumping actions by many developing
countries suggests that many of them are also of the same view. Finally, there appears  little to be gained
by  developing  countries  in  improved  market  access  in  most  developed  country  markets  by  the
establishment of multilateral rules covering anti-trust. Most of these  markets already have reasonably
functioning anti-trust systems which could be used by developing countries.
For all these reasons, developing countries should resist the inclusion of competition policy in a
new Round. There is little that a multilateral agreement focusing on anti-trust, as the EU is suggesting,
would  do to  help them. And  should an agreement be reached, its implementation would require the
building of institutional capacity in an area which is not of high priority for most developing countries.
Foreign Investment. . Foreign investment iv of great importance to developing countries. But the
key questions are, not its importance to development but  whether a balanced  agreement, which reflects
both the interests of developing countries and those of transnational corporations (TNCs) and foreign
investors, can be reached on the issue, and whether the WTO is the right institution in which to pursue it.
The recent history of international negotiations suggests a negative answer to both questions.
24The issue was raised in the Uruguay Round, only to be limited to the trade-related  aspects of
investment measures (TRIMs), because of developing country opposition. A  WTO working group on
investment  was established following  the Singapore Ministerial. In parallel,  there  was an  effort to
conclude an agreement within the OECD, the so called Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
When that failed, the EU proposed that the issue be pursued in the WTO, while the US, has maintained
that, at present, there is no need to pursue an agreement in the WTO. It should also be recalled, that in the
1970's, and much before the MAI, there were several efforts initiated by UNCTAD and backed by many
developing countries to reach an international understanding on restrictive business practices of TNCs-
which also failed, because of opposition by the developed countries
The  effort  to  pursue  an  agreement  within  the  OECD-which  excluded  most  developing
countries, was ill-advised. In addition,  developing countries and many NGOs have argued that the draft
MAI did not contain a proper balance between the rights and responsibilities of TNCs, nor between the
rights and responsiibilites of the TNCs on the one hand and those of the governments receiving foreign
investment,  on the other.
In the last two decades, there has been a great deal of analysis focusing on the enormous potential
that foreign private investment carries for development, but also of the potential problems and pitfalls of a
totally unregulated foreign private investment regime for developing countries with weak supervisory
institutions.  Over the  same period,  developing countries liberalized capital  markets  and regulations
governing  foreign private investment-both  direct and portfolio-- which led to spectacular increases in
the volume of private capital flows to developing countries-all  this without a multilateral  agreement.
Private capital flows have been  concentrated, and many for example, in Sub -Sahara Africa, have not
been  able to  attract foreign private  investment. It  is doubtful however, that  such countries could not
increase their future inflow of foreign investment without a multilateral  agreement.
Given  the  previous history  of international negotiations  on  this  topic,  there  should be  little
optimism  that  a  formal  agreement  which  balances  the  interests  of  foreign  private  investors  and
developing countries is achieveable. Notwithstanding a generally more favorable attitude towards foreign
private investment in developing countries,  recent  private capital volatility has, if anything, made such
an agreement even more difficult. And it is not clear, that such an agreement, while potentially helpful,  is
actually necessary for developing countries wishing to attract foreign private investment.
25Various  aspects  of foreign investment are already addressed in the  GATS, which offers the
opportunity for voluntary commitments. As Hoekman and  Saggi (1999) argue,  there  is potential for
developing countries to increase their commitments in this area; and a more general agreement is neither
needed nor feasible.  Developing countries perceive that the only interest developed countries have in
going beyond voluntary  commitments is that  the  WTO would permit trade retaliation for violations of
any agreement on investment. Indeed,  at present, the WTO has enough issues on its plate; the last thing it
needs is the additional burden of the multitude of disputes bound to arise within any agreement that sets
general rules on foreign private investment.
Labour Standards. Despite being repeatedly rebuffed, most recently at the Singapore Ministerial,
the US continues to bring up labour standards as a topic for possible  WTO negotiations. In this  it has
enjoyed the support of a few developed countries. But, the international community as whole, has always
been of the view that the issue belongs and should be addressed in the International Labor Organization.
The proposal is intended to placate protectionist attitudes primarily of US  labour unions. It is also being
supported by a number of well meaning NGOs, whose legitimate concerns,  in this area, e.g. rregarding
child labour,  indirecty provide "cover" and support to protectionists. It can lead to no plausible benefits
to developing countries' trade ( Maskus,  1997). Therefore it should be strongly resisted as a topic  for
inclusion in the new round of negotiations.
Anti-dumping. The governments of many developing countries (but others as well, for example
Japan)  have complained about the increasing use of anti-dumping measures by developed countries to
limit market access in products of interest to developing countries; they  have also expressed concerns
that developed countries have done little to provide  developing countries with favorable treatment in the
implementation of the agreement. At the same time, developing coutnries themselves have been using
anti-dumping measures with increasing frequency. Many academic economists, noting this trend and the
potential that anti-dumping measures have for abuse and non-transparency, have called for tightening the
existing WTO disciplines in  this area and for the inclusion of this topic in a new Round of negotiations.
Undoubtedly such tightening holds  promise  for improving market  access conditions  in  both
developed and  developing countries. The political climate for  including this  topic in a new Round of
negotiations however, may not be  propitious: many  developing countries may find it difficult to agree to
the tightening of the rules in the use of an instrument -which  the developed countries have been using
26liberally for many years-just  at the time that  developing countries have developed the capacity to use
the instrument themselves.
V. Strategic Options
A.  Scope and Linkages
The  above  analysis  of  the  topics  for  inclusion  in  future  WTO  negotiations  of  interest  to
developing countries has reached two broad conclusions: First, that  in addition to  the already agreed
negotiations on Agriculture and Services, there are two other topics, TRIPS and industrial tariffs  which
are definitely of interest to developing coutnries; and two others, trade and environment and government
procurement  which  potentially  and  under  certain  circumstances  may  be  advantageous  for  various
developing countries to include as part of future negotiations. Second, that there are several other topics
on which multilateral negotiations may be either premature (trade facilitation, electronic commerce) or
counterproductive ( labour standards, competition, foreign investment,) for most developing countries.
Given these conclusions, the question arises as to whether it is in the interest of developing countries for
these topics to be negotiated individually or as part of an overall Millenium Round of WTO negotiations.
There are very strong political economy arguments in favor of an overall Round involving a
single undertaking, but a relatively small number of topics-four  to six as outlined above, so that it does
not severely  tax the  negotiating or  institutional capacity of  countries and  can  be concluded over  a
reasonable time-frame. The basic reason why a single undertaking is needed is to permit trade-offs across
topics. Developing countries have important interests in having developed countries liberalize agriculture,
reduce tariff  peaks  in industrial products, modify TRIPS, as well  as liberalise some  specific service
sectors and modes of supply. On the other hand developed countries would be looking for  additional
developing country commitments in the form of  more bindings and reductions in the bound and applied
rates of industrial products, as well as some additional commitments in service sectors. The only way that
developing countries can overcome the opposition of entrenched protectionism in developed countries-
for example in agriculture or maritime services, or textiles, is to take advantage of the pressure that export
interests in the developed countries will bring to bear on their own governments to negotiate in order  to
open  up  developing  country  markets.  Countervailing  pressure  from  export  interests  of  developed
countries on their  governments is critical to opening up developed country markets in areas of interest to
developing countries (Krueger, 1999).
27This pressure and  linkages may exist within a particular topic-e.g.  industrial tariffs,  but are
maximized if there are opportunities for linkages across a wider set of negotiations. Conversely, topic by
topic or sector by sector  negotiations, tend to focus primarily on areas of interest to developed country
exporters: once their demands for increased access in a particular sector-e.g.  information technology are
satisfied, they  no  longer have to  provide  domestic support to  multilateral negotiations  to  their  own
government-which  then  have  to  deal  only  with  the  ever-present protectionist  lobbies  that  oppose
improving market access.
The danger  for developing countries of  a  large set of negotiations is that they will tax their
institutional capacity to  negotiate and implement new agreements. This  is why  developing countries
should attempt to keep the negotiation package to the minimum necessary of no more than four to  six
topics. To use the old bicycle analogy once more: the momentum of a Millennium  Round is needed to
push the bicycle forward, but we should not  load the bicycle with so much baggage that it collapses from
the excessive weight.
The other question developing countries have to address is the linkage between problems they
have in the implementation of the UR agreements and the launching of a new Round. Some developing
countries have stated that a  new Round should not be launched unless and until the URA are  "fully
implemented". This  is  obviously a  good  tactical  position, especially  to  fend  off  developed  country
demands for inclusion in a new Round of topics not in the interest of developing countries. But it is clear
that in certain areas, for example in the implementation of the ATC, the legitimate developing country
concerns  are with  the  manner  in which  the  agreement  has  been  implemented by  some developed
countries, not with  specific violations of the agreement itself.  Similarly, a  number of the developed
country commitments to provide special and diffe:rential  treatment for developing countries have  been
made in such general terms (for example the provisions under Article 15 of the understandinng on Article
VI )'5 that it is unclear what specific actions need to be taken or guarantees given before a new Round is
launched. There are two areas however, in which it may be worthwhile for developing countries to seek to
obtain specifc guarantees or commitments before the launching of a new Round. These are the transition
periods  that  have been  provided to  developing countries to  implement the  URA and  the  technical
assistance that has been offered to developing countries to help them implement their commitments under
'5  See Michalopoulos,  1999b
28the UR. The way to do this is as part of an overall  understanding of what is to be included in the Round and
the nature of special and differential  treatment to be provided.
B. The Basis for Negotiations: The Role of Special and Differential Treatment
Over the years, a variety of provisions have been introduced into the GATT and then in the  WTO
agreements to provide S&D treatment ( WTO, 1999a). These fall into the following two broad categories:
(a) positive actions by developed country members or international  institutions; (b) exceptions to the overall
rules contained in the agreements that apply to developing countries and, sometimes, additional exceptions
for the least developed countries. One of the important strategic questions developing countries would need
to  address in a  new Round of negotiations would be the scope and nature of special and differential
treatment they would seek to obtain in any new agreements.
There are three kinds of positive actions that developed countries have agreed to take to suppolt
developing countries participation in  intemational trade: (a) extend preferential access to their markets,
primarily through the voluntarily provided Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and through further
preferences for LDCs;  (b) provide technical and other assistance -as  noted above;  (c) implement the
overall agreements in ways which are beneficial or least damaging to the interests of developing and least
developed countries.
There are also  two fundamental ways in which developing and least developed countries have
accepted differential obligations under the WTO agreements: (a) They enjoy freedom to undertake policies
which limit access to their markets or provide support to domestic producers or exporters in ways which are
not allowed to other members. The basic mechanism for this is the  principle of non-full reciprocity  This
principle is recognized in GATT (1994) Article XXXVI and in the "Enabling Clause". Consistent with these
provisions, many developing countries have not bound tariffs on their industrial products to the same extent
as developed countries or have agreed to bind at substantially  higher than applied levels. Similar provisions
for non-reciprocity are included in GATS, Article XIX:2. In addition, specific  provisions in various WTO
agreements give developing countries  greater freedom to provide protection to domestic industry and use
trade restrictions to address balance-of-payments problems  (GATT Article XVIII) or provide support to
small farmers  (Agreement on Agriculture). (b) Developing countries (as noted above) are also provided
with  more  time  in  meeting obligations or  commitments under the  agreements. In  some cases,  more
favourable treatment involves a combination of (a) and (b).
29The question that developing countries need to address is which of the above forns  of S&D should be
emphasized in the various upcoming negotiations.
Non-reciprocity. In the negotiations in agriculture as well as those in services and  industrial
tariffs, the main question relate to  how developing countries deal with the question of non-full reciprocity in
the  exchange of  liberalizing "concessions" and  the  extent to  which  they  push  for  different  rules or
exceptions to disciplines.  Indeed, further liberalization of industrial  tariffs will actually tend to erode further
the preference margins of GSP.' 6
Regarding the implementation of non-full reciprocity a growing body of analytical and empirical
work which suggests that the very exercise by the developing countries of their rights under the various
provisions that exempt them from various WTO disciplines, has had negative effects  on their trade and
development prospects (Srinivasan, 1998). First, developing countries by not participating in the exchange
of reciprocal reductions in trade barriers have missed the opportunity of gaining reductions in the trade
barriers in developed countries on products of specific export interest to them-as  evidenced by the fact that
tariffs of developed countries on manufactures of special interest to the developing countries are higher than
average (Martin and Winters, 1996). This is the fundamental reason why a number of developing countries
decided to  actively participate in the UR through the exchange of  reductions in trade barriers-albeit
without engaging in full reciprocity.
The second line of argumentation that has evolved and gained increasing acceptance in the last two
decades attacks the very premise on which exceptions from WTO disciplines is based, namely that higher
levels of protection are conducive to development.  According to this line of thinking, the permissiveness of
WTO provisions has enabled  developing countries to maintain higher levels of domestic protection. But
this  protection  has introduced distortions in dom.-stic resource allocation, encouraged rent seeking and
waste and adversely affected growth in productivity and sustainable development (Srinivasan, 1998, Finger
and  Winters,1998).  Similarly,  that  balance  of  payments  problems  are  best  addressed  through
macroeconomic policy, including exchange rate adjustments which does not have the adverse effects on
resource allocation and productivity created by protection. In a similar vein,  other analyses suggest that the
developing countries that can be expected to benefit:  the most from the Uruguay Round are those that have
16  It could be argued that global trade liberalizaticn inevitably would lead to a reduction of GSP benefits
and that this should not be a cause to refrain from liberalization on an MFN basis. For an overview of
GSP implementation and its limitations see UNCTAD, 1994.
30reduced their barriers the  most, partly because of improved  market access opportunities through the
exchange of reciprocal reduction of barriers  and partly because of the positive effects of their own lower
protection on their economies (Martin and Winters, 1996).
It is appropriate to discuss in this context also the question of the "credit" that developing countries
could or should get as a consequence of their own autonomous liberalization of trade in goods or services.
This issue was raised first in a World Bank paper in 1985,  (Michalopoulos, 1985), in advance of the UR
when it became apparent that a number of developing countries were liberalizing their trade regimes, and
the question was how to obtain "credit" for such liberalization in the upcoming Round.'7The issue was
subsequently discussed in the Functioning of the GATT System (FOGS) group. There was no general
provision in the UR to deal with this issue, because in the context of the GATT the primary way  of taking
into account  autonomous liberalization of applied tariffs  is  if  it  is translated  into  a  legally  binding
commitments.  18
Most recently, the WTO considered a draft statement under which WTO Members would "agree
that the value of autonomous liberalization will be recognized as contributions to future multilateral trade
negotiations...  subject to the government concerned agreeing to enter into contractual WTO commitments
to guarantee the lasting character of the trade  liberalization that is involved". While agreement on the
statement has been temporarily been blocked by a few developing countries which are fearful that it would
encourage more liberalization commitments  and bindings, it is likely that such a statement would be adopted
as a principle in a new Round of negotiations.  But even if that were to occur, it is unclear how the "value" of
autonomous liberalization  would be recognized unless it involves future bindings.
The broad conclusion that can be  drawn from this analysis is that ative  participation in the
exchange of liberalizing concessions is the only way to maximize the benefits that developing countries can
obtain from the up-coming negotiations. The more developing countries try to rely on  non-reciprocal
concessions, the less the  benefits  they are likely to derive. This is an important matter  for the many
countries, especially in Africa,  but also in  Asia which did not actively participate in the UR and have
bound tariffs in only a few industrial products or have high ceiling bindings in many others. They can use
the leverage that they have to obtain concessions in other areas of importance  to them.
17  See  also,  Krueger  and Michalopoulos,  1985;  Balassa  and  Michalopoulos,  1986.
18  Some developing  countries  however,  apparently  included  such reductions  in their UR offers. It is difficult to
gauge  how  much "credit"  they actually  received in  the context  of the overall  tariff  negotiations.
31Rules and Transition Periods. With regard to exceptions from "rules", we noted earlier how the
rules on agricultural liberalization were being written with the developed countries protection in mind.
There are clearly some market failures in the agricultural sector of developing countries requiring attention
and appropriate exceptions-which  are  addressed  in the  Agreement-and  which  should be retained.
Similarly, institutional constraints in many developing countries need to be carefully reviewed and suitable
time extensions provided to them regarding the implementation of any commitments in such potential areas
of negotiation as  TRIPS, government procurement  or the environment. But these should not be interpreted
as a justification for wholesale extensions of time limits in other areas, for example in subsidies where the
issue is not the lack of institutional  capacity but unwlillingness  to reform.
Technical  Assistance  and  other  Developed  Country  Commitments  Concerns  about  the
implementation of developed country commitments regarding technical assistance in the context of the UR
should carry over to  any technical assistance requirements resulting from new agreements. Developing
countries should not be prepared to accept commitments they can not implement within the context of
existing institutional capacity in exchange for  vague offers of technical assistance. Explicit developing
country commitments in areas in which they have implementation difficulties should be balanced with
explicit developed country commitments to fund the needed technical or other assistance.  Similarly, with
vaguely worded generalized commitments by developed countries to implement  certain agreements or
provisions in ways "favorable" to developing countries: It  is probably better for developing countries to
exchange all of these many vague references for a few concrete developed country commitments.
Least Developed Countries. The special problems and constraints facing the LDCs have received
recognition in the WTO through a number of additional special and differential provisions (WTO, 1999a)..
In some cases LDCs are exempted completely from disciplines or are  provided with more  extended
transition  periods to  implement agreements. Moreover, developed countries (  and  other  developing
countries) have made  additional preferential market-access commitments for LDCs  countries; and  an
international effort to co-ordinate trade-related  technical assistance activities is in the process of being
implemented. The question is the nature and scope of special and differential treatment to be extended  to
LDCs countries in the context of a new Round of negotiations.
There are already some indications that developed countries may  be prepared to  go further  in
extending voluntary GSP to these countries, perhaps even offering a commitment to duty free access to all
32LDC exports as part of new Round. 1 9 Such commitments are relatively easy to make in political economy
terms, as LDCs account for very small fractions of developed country imports in most product categories.
As a consequence LDCs may not have to "offer" any new liberalizing commitments, in order to obtain
improved market access.
On the other hand, most analyses suggest, that the main  constraints to LDC export expansion
derive from weaknesses in institutional capacities as well as supply side factors (UNCTAD, 1998; WTO,
1998c). Thus, the key issues for LDCs in the upcoming negotiations is how to ensure concrete and effective
support for trade-related capacity building measures in such areas as agriculture, services or TRIPS. At the
same time it is important for LDCs to recognize some of the implications and pitfalls of  past developing
country experience with the flexibility in the application of WTO rules and disciplines: It could be argued
for example, that  existing  S&D provisions permit LDCs the most freedom of policy choice possible, in
areas such as subsidies, that they can least afford. Tighter WTO  disciplines in some policy areas may be
helpful to LDC govemments that wish to introduce  and gain domestic  consensus for trade policy reform.
VI. Conclusions
Developing  countries  can  derive  significant  benefits  from  a  WTO  Millennium  Round  of
negotiations. While the interests of different groups of countries will differ, there is a number of important
issues beyond the agreed topics of agriculture and services, which developing countries as a group  may
wish  to  include in  a  new  Round, especially those  of  industrial tariffs  and  TRIPS.  It  may  also  be
advantageous that environment and government procurement be  included in such a  Round, provided
appropriate assurances regarding the provision of institutional support to permit developing countries to
meet  their commitments can be assured. Other topics should be resisted for inclusion because they are
either counterproductive,  premature or do not hold promise for net benefits for  large groups of developing
countries.
The new Round should be a single undertaking in order to maximize the opportunities for trade-
offs across issues and for political economy reasons, i.e. to permit liberalizing forces in both developed and
developing countries to exert pressure on governments for a liberalized trade environment world-wide. But
19  Based on statements  by some developed  countries  in the recent WTO High Level Symposium  on Trade and
Development.
33the Round should not contain too many issues, as it would strain the institutional and  implementation
capacity of many developing countries.
Developing countries should be prepared to exchange mutually liberalizing trade  concessions,
because that is the only way to maximize the benefits they obtain from multilateral trade negotiations. Their
focus on special and differential treatment should be on  the establishment  of realistic transition periods and
technical assistance to address institutional capacity  constraints.
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Member  Least  CAIRNS  OECD  Textile  Member  Least  CAIRNS  OECD  Textile
Deve-  Bureau  Deve-  Bureau
loped  loped
Antigua-Barbuda*  EC
Angola*  x  Egypt*  x
Argentina*  x  x  El Salvador  x
Australia  x  I  x  Ecuador*
Austria  x  Fiji*  x
Bahrain*  Finland  x
Bangladesh*  x  x  France  x
Barbados*  Gabon*
Belgium  x  Gambia*  x
Belize*  x  Germany  x
Benin*  Ghana*
Bolivia*  Greece  x
Botswana*  Grenada*
Brazil*  x  x  Guatemala*.
Brunei*  Guyana*
Bulgaria"*  Guinea*
Burkina  Faso*  x  Guinea-Bissau*  x
Burundi*  x  Haiti*  x
Camneroon*  Honduras*  x
Canada  x  x  Hong Kong, China*  x
Central African Republic*  Hungary",  x
Chad*  x  India*  x
Chile*  x  Indonesia*  x  x
Colombia*  x  x  Ireland  x
Congo*  x  Iceland  x
Costa Rica*  x  Israel"*
Cote  d'lvoire*  Italy  x
Cuba*  Jamaica*  x
Cyprus*  x  Japan  x
Czech  Republic*  x  Kenya*  ____
Dem.  Rep.  of Congo*  x  Kyrgyz  Republic*
Denmark  x  Korea*  x  x
Dorninica*  Kuwait*
Dominican  Republic*  r  I  Latvia**
f Djibouti*  I_I  ;__  Lesotho*  x
*  Developing Economies
**  Transition and Other
Note: Turkey left the ITCB in 1996
1: International Textile and Clothing Bureau
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Deve-  Bureau
1 Deve-  Bureau]
loped  loped
Liechtenstein  Romania**
Luxemburg  x  Rwanda*  x
Macau*  x  St. Christ. & Nevis*
Madagascar*  x  St. Lucia*
Malaysia*  x  St. Vincent & Grenadines*
Malawi*  x  Senegal*
Maldives*  x  Sierra Leone*  x
Mali*  x  Singapore*
Malta*  _  Slovakia**
Morocco*  Slovenia**
Mauritius*  Solomon Islands*  x
Mauritania*  x  South Africa*  x
Mexico*  x  x  Spain  x
Mongolia**  Sri Lanka*  x
Mozambique*  x  Swaziland
Myanmar*  x  Sweden
Namibia  Switzerland  x
Netherlands  x  Surinam*
New Zealand  x  x  Tanzania*  x
Nicaragua*  Thailand*  _x  __  x
Niger*  x  Togo*  x
Nigeria*  Trinidad & Tobago*
Norway  x  Tunisia*
Pakistan*  x  Turkey*
Panamia*  Uganda*  x
Papua New Guinea*  T_1_I___  T  United Arab Emirates*
Paraguay  x  x  United  Kingdom
Peru*  x  United  States
Philippines*  x  _Uruguay*  _  x
Poland**  x  Venezuela*
Portugal  x  Zambia*  x
Qatar*  Zimbabwe*
*  Developing Economies
**  Transition  and Other
Note:  Turkey left the ITCB in 1996
:  International Textile and Clothing Bureau
39AP'ENDIX
SUMMARY OF URA IMIPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Agriculture:  (1) Market Access issues, including the high tariff  level, and restrictive  impact of tariff
quotas; (2) export subsidies and domestic support programs tend to undermine competitive positions of
efficient developing country exporters; similar effects result from the lack of international disciplines in
the use of export credits. (CAIRNS, ASEAN, Egypt); (3) developing countries need greater flexibility in
implementing reductions of domestic support and Ihe way to do it (Egypt, India, Pakistan).
Services:  (a) Provisions regarding increasing participation of developing countries in services trade and
access to technology have not been effective in increasing service exports from these countries (Brazil,
Egypt,  India,  ASEAN,  Peru),  (b)  need  to  work  on  safeguards provisions  (several  Latin American
countries); (c) lack of sufficient progress in movement of natural persons mode( Egypt, Turkey).
Market Access and Industrial Tariffs : tariff peaks, escalation continue to limit access in certain sectors
( Brazil, Senegal).
Textiles : (I)  While developed countries implemented the letter of the ATC, the way they did it, did not
result in meaningful liberalization of the sector or growth in textile imports (ITCB members, ASEAN,
African group);  (2) There was excessive resort to the special safeguard provisions of the ATC as well as
excessive use of other trade remedies, e.g.  antidumping (ITCB, ASEAN, several others); (3)  special
interests of small exporters or LDC not being adequately addressed (ITCB).
Antidumping:  (1)  Unfair  use  of  anti-dumping  measures  compromising  benefits  from  UR  trade
liberalization  (  Brazil,  India,  ASEAN,  Egypt,  Korea,  Pakistan);  (2)  exploration  of  constructive
alternatives  to  AD  for  developing  countries (Article  15) not  implemented;  (3)  different  and  more
restrictive standard of judicial review (Article 17) inappropriate (  ASEAN, India, Cuba, India, Pakistan).
Subsidies: Need to  increase flexibility in the use  of export subsidies for  developing countries (India,
Egypt, several Central American and Caribbean countries).
TBT,SPS : (1) Excessive levels of protection resulting in market access barriers (ASEAN, Brazil, Costa
Rica, India,  Pakistan,  Venezuela); (2)  inadequate participation of developing  countries in  standards
40setting bodies resulting in standards that do not take into account developing country situations (ASEAN,
Egypt, India).
TRIPS:  (1) difficulties of implementation of commitments by 2000 (Brazil, Egypt); (2) asymmetry in
the protection provided to innovators relative to consumers; (3) need to enhance protection of indigenous
technology ( India).
DSM: (1) Limited access to DSM by developing countries because of lack of specialized expertise, high
costs of litigation ( Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Peru, Senegal, Uruguay); (2) procedural changes needed to
take into account of limited institutional capacity of developing countries ( India).
S&D: (1) need to make "best efforts " provisions of various agreements more operational ; (2) adequacy
of thresholds for developing countries need to reconsidered ( Egypt, South Africa).
Technical Assistance:  (1) Inadequacy of assistance levels mentioned in following  areas: SPS, TBT,
TRIPS,  DSB, Least developed Countries in general (various  countries)  (2) need to increase level of TA
from WTO regular budget (Tanzania, Hong Kong, China).
Transition Periods  . Transition periods excessively optimistic  in some agreements; need review  for
consistency with developing country capacity to implement (Egypt, South Africa).
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